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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property - A View of the Proposed Revisions
by William E. Schuyler*
Celebrating its centennial in 1984, the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property' is a worldwide treaty to which ninety-two
nations adhere. 2
* Partner, Schuyler, Banner, Birch, McKie & Beckett, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Catholic
University 1935; J.D. Georgetown Law School 1940. The author served as the ambassador to
the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Paris Convention, 1981. He held the post of
Commissioner of Patents, 1969-7 1.
I Paris Convention of 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 and 24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 and
7727, 192 L.N.T.S. 4459 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
2 W. WHITE & B. RAVENSCROF-, PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 571 [hereinafter
cited as PATENTS]. The ninety-two member nations are:
Members From
*Algeria
*Argentina (1)
*Australia
Norfolk
*Nauru
*Austria
*Bahamas (1)
*Belgium
*Benin
*Brazil (1)
*Bulgaria
*Burundi
*Cameroun
*Canada (1)
*Central African Republic
*Chad
*Congo
*Cuba
tCyprus
*Czechoslovakia
*Denmark and Faroe Islands
'Dominican Republic
*Egypt
*Finland
*France,including Overseas Depts. and Territories
*Gabon
*German Fed. Rep.
*German Dem. Rep.
*Ghana
*Greece
*Guinea
March 1, 1966
February 10, 1967
August 5, 1907
July 29, 1936
July 29, 1936
January 1, 1909
October 20, 1967
July 7, 1884
January 10, 1967
July 7, 1884
June 13, 1921
September 3, 1977
May 10, 1964
September 1, 1923
November 19, 1963
November 19, 1963
September 2, 1963
November 17, 1904
January 17, 1966
October 5, 1919
October 1, 1894
July 11, 1890
July 1, 1951
September 20, 1921
July 7, 1884
February 29, 1964
May 1, 1903
May 1, 1903
September 28, 1976
October 2, 1924
February 5, 1982
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The protection of industrial property as defined by the Paris Con-
vention primarily refers to patents, trademarks and the repression of un-
tHaiti
*Holy See
*Hungary
Iceland
*Indonesia (1)
tlran
*Iraq
*Ireland
*Israel
*Italy
*Ivory Coast
*Japan
*Jordan
*Kenya
*Korea (North)
*Korea (South)
Lebanon
*Libya
*Liechtenstein
* Luxembourg
* Madagascar
*Malawi
*Malta (1)
*Mauritania
*Mauritius
*Mexico
*Monaco
*Morocco
*Netherlands
* Netherlands Antilles
New Zealand
*Niger
tNigeria
*Norway
*Philippines (1)
*Poland
*Portugal with Azores and Madeira
*Rumania
San Marino
*Senegal
*South Africa
*Spain
*Sri Lanka (1)
*Surinam
*Sweden
*Switzerland
Syria
tTanzania (Tanganyika only)
*Togo
tTrinidad and Tobago
*Tunisia
*Turkey (1)
*Uganda
*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Russia)
*United Kingdom
* Hong Kong
July 1, 1958
September 29, 1960
January 1, 1909
May 5, 1962
October 1, 1888
December 16, 1959
January 24, 1976
December 4, 1925
September 12, 1933
July 7, 1884
October 23, 1963
July 15, 1899
July 17, 1972
June 14, 1965
June 10, 1980
May 4, 1980
September 1, 1924
September 28, 1976
July 14, 1933
June 30, 1922
December 21, 1963
July 6, 1964
October 20, 1967
April 11, 1965
September 24, 1976
September 7, 1903
April 29, 1956
July 30, 1917
July 7, 1884
July 1, 1890
September 7, 1891
July 5, 1964
September 2, 1963
July 1, 1885
September 27, 1965
November 10, 1919
July 7, 1884
October 6, 1920
March 4, 1960
December 21, 1963
December 1, 1947
July 7, 1884
December 29, 1952
July 1, 1890
July 1, 1885
July 7, 1884
September 1, 1924
January 1, 1938
September 10, 1967
May 14, 1908
July 7, 1884
October 10, 1925
June 14, 1965
July 1, 1965
July 7, 1884
November 16, 1977
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fair competition.3 While repression of unfair competition does not come
within the traditional definition of property, it is, nevertheless, an impor-
tant feature of the Paris Convention, inserted in the treaty for the first
time in 1925. 4 The treaty has been revised six times since its inception in
1883. 5
In recent years the term "intellectual property" has gained in-
creased usage over the term "industrial property." The former, a more
comprehensive term, contemplates copyrights as well as patents, trade-
marks and unfair competition. Copyright protection is particularly
significant in the licensing of computer software.6 While copyright pro-
tection of software is not protected worldwide, some countries are at least
contemplating amendments to their copyright laws specifically to pro-
vide for its protection. This is a dynamic area in the law, subject to
constant change and gaining in importance.
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, i.e.,
patents, trademarks and unfair competition, is one of the oldest multina-
tional treaties that is still respected. It has survived two world wars, with
continued recognition by both sides of the conflict. In the beginning, the
Paris Convention was an arrangement among the major industrial coun-
tries of Europe, joined by the United States, to facilitate, encourage and
upgrade the protection of industrial property. The membership has
changed significantly since its inception. More than one half of the pres-
ent member states are identified as developing countries in United Na-
tions terminology. 7 While China is not yet a member of the Paris Union,
United States of America, including Guam, Puerto Rico,
* American Samoa, and Virgin Islands May 30, 1887
*Upper Volta November 19, 1963
*Uruguay March 18, 1967
*Vietnam March 8, 1949
Yugoslavia February 26, 1921
:Zaire January 31, 1975
Zambia (1) April 6, 1965
*Zimbabwe April 18, 1980
*Countries bound by The Hague Amendment.
tCountries bound by the Lisbon Text.
*Countries bound by the Act of Stockholm.
Countries without a symbol bound by the Acts of London.
(l)Acceptance of the Stockholm Act excluding Articles I to 12.
3 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 2 § (2), which reads, "The protection of industrial
property has as its objects patents, utility models, industrial designs, trade marks, service marks,
trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair compe-
tition." July 14, 1967.
4 The Hague Revision, November 6, 1925. PATENTS, supra note 2, at 525.
.5 Revised at Brussels, Belgium, December 14, 1900; at Washington, D.C., June 2, 1911; at
The Hague, Netherlands, November 6, 1925; at London, England, June 2, 1934; at Lisbon,
Portugal, October 31, 1958; and at Stockholm, Sweden, July 14, 1967. PATENTS, supra note 2,
at 525.
6 Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software, World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), 1978. WIPO was adopted by the Stockholm Conference, 1967. Records
of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, 2 vols., 1967.
7 See supra note 2. The United Nations classification of countries and territories according
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it is contemplating the installation of a patent system which will qualify
it for membership. When China does become a member, the nation with
the largest population in the world will be considered a developing coun-
try for purposes of this treaty. Today industrial countries who started
the Paris Convention constitute only about a third of the member states.
Other members are industrial countries from non-European parts of the
wbrld such as Japan and Australia. The remaining members are the So-
cialist bloc countries. This change in the membership of the Paris Union
has presented some interesting and difficult negotiating situations.
I. Collateral Treaties
Member nations of the Paris Union have generated additional, spe-
cific treaties. One is the Patent Cooperation Treaty, negotiated in 19708
and now in operation. It is a treaty within the framework of the Paris
Union, designed to facilitate the filing of patent applications in countries
around the world; a procedure that had not previously been coordinated.
A second collateral treaty is the Trademark Registration Treaty,9 simpli-
fying procedures for multinational registration of trademarks and service
marks. The United States has not yet adhered to the Trademark Regis-
tration Treaty.
The European Patent Office, organized under a treaty' 0 by a
number of European countries,"1 is an indirect off-shoot of the Paris
Convention. While European countries encountered serious difficulties
reaching agreement on the provisions of the Treaty for the European
Patent Office, during the negotiations of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
to main economic areas has been adopted for purposes of statistical convenience only, and fol-
lows that employed by the Statistical Office of the United Nations. Thus, the statistical cover-
age of developing countries excludes countries in Southern Europe and the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe and Asia.
Countries and territories are classified according to four main economic areas as follows:
Developedmarket ecomony countries: United States, Canada, EEC (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United King-
dom), EFTA (Austria, Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land), Spain, Yugoslavia, Israel, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa.
Socialist countries of Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR.
Socialist countries of Asia: China, Mongolia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Viet
Nam.
Developitg countries andterritoris: all other countries and territories in Africa, Asia, America,
and Oceania not specified above.
a Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645-7906, T.I.A.S. No. 8733,
negotiated at the Washington Diplomatic Conference, May & June, 1970.
9 Trademark Registration Treaty, June 12, 1973, (negotiated at the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, June 12, 1973), reprinted in Offner's International Trademark Service 7136-7362
(1981).
10 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC), Munich, Oct. 5, 1973. U.N. No.
16207. EPC, Art. 6. See Cornish, The European Patent Conventions, 1976 J. Bus. L. 112.
11 The sixteen member nations are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and West Germany. Cornish, supra note 10, at 112.
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by all members of the Paris Union, solutions for the European problem
were found. Today the Patent Cooperation Treaty is not utilized as fre-
quently as the European Patent Office, but there would not be a Euro-
pean Patent Office - or at least it would not have come about as soon -
if there had not been a diplomatic conference to negotiate the Patent
Cooperation Treaty.
II. Rule of Unanimity
All six revisions of the Paris Convention were adopted by a consen-
sus of the member states participating in a diplomatic conference. In
international negotiations consensus means "adopted without dissent."
In the past, a revision or a proposal has been turned down because only
one member state objected. Negotiations for present revisions, which
have entered their third year, are being dominated by the developing
countries which, since the last revision, are in the majority. Developing
countries requested the present Revision Conference in order to obtain
concessions which they believe will facilitate their technological
development.
Five years ago, preparatory meetings were held in Geneva where
these revisions were first being discussed. The first session of the Diplo-
matic Conference' 2 was convened in Geneva in 1980, and the delegates
from all the member states spent a month discussing the rules of proce-
dure. There was a stalemate on the voting rule. Developing countries
insisted upon a qualified majority (two-thirds or three-quarters) for
adoption of revisions. Industrial countries wanted to continue prior rules
of adoption by consensus. At the conclusion of that conference, over ob-
jection by the United States, the President of the Conference announced
that the rule had been changed. No longer would one dissent be enough
to bar revision. The developing countries, with the agreement of the
Common Market countries, decided that proposals would be adopted
unless there were more than twelve dissenting votes. This gave the Com-
mon Market a potential veto, but it took away the veto of the United
States or Japan, or any other individual country. Only the United States
objected to the announced change in the voting rule. Repeatedly, the
United States has made it clear that it would not recognize the legality of
any revision of the Paris Convention adopted by less than a consensus,
including any change in the voting rule.
In October 1981, the second session of the Diplomatic Conference
convened in Nairobi. At the outset the United States again declared that
it did not recognize the revised voting rule, but that it would participate
in the conference and do everything possible to reach solutions that could
be adopted by consensus. While the eventual outcome is still unsure,
there has been progress toward a reinstatement of the consensus rule.
12 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON
THE REVISION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION, Geneva, 4 Feb. to 4 March 1980.
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III. Principle of National Treatment
Many multinational treaties are based upon reciprocal arrange-
ments by which parties agree to do the same thing for one another or to
retaliate in the same way. These arrangements can have adverse results.
A hundred years ago, representatives of the governments negotiating the
Paris Convention recognized the difficulties inherent in reciprocity when
dealing with an intangible like a patent or a trademark registration. To
the credit of those negotiators, a keystone of the Paris Convention is a
principle called the "national treatment." Under that principle, with re-
spect to industrial property, every member of the Paris Union agrees to
treat the nationals of every other member state the same as it treats its
own nationals. Each country has patent law that must be applied
equally and uniformly to its citizens and to nationals of other member
states.' 3 That principle has never been compromised. Each state decides
for itself how strong or weak a patent system it desires. The same princi-
ple applies to trademark registration systems and control of unfair com-
petition: member countries apply their laws uniformly to all members of
the Paris Union.
The Paris Union is not concerned with the enforcement of a patent
or trademark registration. Patent or trademark registration is limited to
the territory of the state that grants it, and the Paris Union does not
provide any extraterritorial mechanism to implement enforcement.
IV. Rights of Priority
The Paris Convention provides minimum standards that all of the
member states agree to observe. One of the most useful provisions con-
cerns what are known as priorities for the filing date of applications for
patent and trademark registrations.' 4 If an applicant files a patent ap-
plication in any country that is a member of the Paris Union, he or she
has one year within which to file a corresponding application in other
countries in order to receive the benefit of the initial filing date in the
other countries: Because rights to patent property and inventions ordi-
narily go to the first applicant who files for the patent, this provision for
retroactivity is important. An applicant has one year in which to evalu-
ate the subject matter of his patent, and to comply with the procedural
regulations of different countries. In the case of trademarks, a similar
provision of the Paris Convention provides six months in which to file
applications for registration in other countries.
V. Provisions Concerning Patents
Another general principle which member states of the Paris Union
agree to apply is that a patent in any country is independent of its coun-
13 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
14 Id at art. 4.
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terpart in any other country.15 If a patent exists in each of ten countries
on the same invention, and if the patent is held invalid in one of those
ten, the other nine patents survive to whatever extent the national law
says they should survive. This provision was inserted 16 in order to negate
laws in some countries which had provided that invalidation of the origi-
nal patent invalidated corresponding patents in other countries.
There are other minor provisions. For example, the validity of a
patent cannot depend upon compliance with government regulations
concerning the sale of the patented product.' 7 To eliminate undesirable
laws in some countries, importation of a patented product cannot entail
forfeiture of the patent.' 8 Matters of forfeiture, importation and obliga-
tions of the patentee are the subject of many demands by developing
countries.
Still another provision of the Paris Convention concerns protection
of a product that is manufactured according to a patented process and
then imported into a country where a patent on that process exists. i9
While the provision does not mandate absolute protection, it does re-
quire member countries to apply the same law to imported products as
the country applies to products manufactured domestically.
A. Requirements for Working Patented Invention
Unlike the United States, most countries of the world place an obli-
gation on the patent owner to "work" the invention. "Work" is a term of
art that means "manufacture." If a patent owner obtains a patent on a
product in Argentina, for example, Argentina may require that the own-
er manufacture the product there, or risk jeopardizing his Argentine pat-
ent. The Paris Convention recognizes the right of every country to
require an owner to work the invention -that is, to manufacture the
invention in the country where the owner has the patent.
"Working" is not an American concept and is not in United States
statutes. Anybody in the world can obtain a patent in the United States
and do nothing to work the invention. In the United States, as long as
the patent owner pays the maintenance fees, the patent will continue in
force for the full seventeen years.20
B. Sanctions for Nonworking
While the Paris Convention recognizes the right of any member
state to require working of a patented invention, it imposes some limita-
tions on the sanctions which may be imposed for failure to work. First,
15 Id. art. 4 bis.
16 Id. and supra note 5, Brussels Revision, 1900.
17 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4 quater.
18 Id. art. 5A (1).
19 Id. art. 5 quater.
20 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1981).
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the patent may be forfeited. 2' Second, it may be subject to a compulsory
license. 22 In the case of a compulsory license, the Paris Convention pro-
vides that no application for a compulsory license may be made until
four years after a patent application is filed, or three years after a patent
is granted. It further provides that the patent may not be forfeited unless
a compulsory license has been in effect for two years and the invention is
still not satisfactorily manufactured. In all of these cases the Paris Union
requires a member state to provide that nonworking may be excused.
C Proposal for Compulsory Exclusive License
In the diplomatic conference in Nairobi, 23 the developing countries,
over the sole objection of the United States, demanded and obtained an
agreement on two very important issues. The first issue concerns the
compulsory license which, under certain conditions, could be made ex-
clusive, thereby excluding even the patent owner. If a patent is not being
"worked" in Argentina, for example, the exclusive compulsory license
sought by the developing countries would authorize the Argentine gov-
ernment to grant an exclusive license to someone other than the patent
owner. Moreover, once a patent is granted, and someone other than the
patent owner has an exclusive license to manufacture or sell the product,
the owner cannot even import the product into the country where the
patent is now being worked. The exclusive compulsory license keeps a
patent owner from using his or her own invention in the country in
which it is patented. Thus, if someone besides the original patent owner
has an exclusive license on the manufacture of an alternator which is
used 'in General Motors automobiles, the Argentine Government may
not allow importation of the automobile unless the alternator is first
taken off. It is easy to see that implementation of the exclusive compul-
sory license provisions will have a tremendous adverse impact on interna-
tional trade.
D. Proposal for Automatic Forfeiture
The second issue concerns a provision called "automatic forfeiture."
If an owner is not manufacturing a patented invention in Argentina, an
offical in the Argentine Government could decide, solely on the basis of
subjective judgment, that the patent will be forfeited. This can be done
anytime after five years from the grant of the patent.
VI. Opposition by United States to Exclusive License and Forfeiture
Proposals
In Nairobi, the exclusive license and forfeiture provisions were
21 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5A (3).
22 Id. art. 5A (2).
23 The author served as Ambassador to the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the
Paris Convention at Nairobi, 1981. Eds. note.
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agreed to by everyone except the United States. At the conclusion of the
Nairobi Conference in 1981, the United States announced it would not
be a party to any treaty that included either of these two provisions.
Although little was said about the United States' announcement at the
time, it was subsequently published in the minutes of the Conference.
United States industry is concerned about these proposals, and through
its counterpart in other developed countries it has generated resistance
and attempted to change the positions taken by other governments. To
some extent this activity has been carried on in developing countries as
well.
As a result, at a meeting in Geneva in June of 1982, the developing
countries reached an informal agreement to leave these controversial
items off the agenda at the Geneva conference scheduled for October
1982, provided the United States would engage in informal discussions
with representatives of the developing countries to attempt to reach some
agreement. At the third session of the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva
in October and November 1982, it became evident that the developing
countries were not interested in a treaty which did not include the
United States as a party. Although final agreements were not reached in
Geneva, it is probable that an agreement 24 - based upon a proposal
made by the United States in Nairobi in 198125 but rejected at that time
- will be reached on these two critical items. This is illustrative of the
importance of the United States in the transfer of technology on a world-
wide basis.
A. Potential Adverse Impact on Transfer of Technology
These two issues-the compulsory exclusive license and the auto-
matic forfeiture provision-are important in licensing because a license
may provide for the sale of a patented product in a developing country
to be sold by the patent owner's licensee. If there is no manufacturer in
the country because, for example, the market will not support a manu-
facturing plant, the patent could be forfeited at the end of five years,
rendering the license a nullity. Nothing prevents any government from
limiting patents to five-year terms, but the national treatment principle
would require a five-year term for nationals of the country as well as
aliens. Under an automatic forfeiture provision, on the other hand, a
developing country could have an effective five-year term for aliens and
a longer term for its own nationals.
These difficulties have surfaced because multinational corporations
are using patents to monopolize the importation of products into devel-
oping countries, and to sustain the price of patented products. Develop-
ing countries may want to encourage competition with patented
products, or may simply want some leverage to force down the price of
24 Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1982. Proposal by Chairman of Main Committee I.
25 Official Document of Diplomatic Conference, Nairobi, 1981. PR/DC/32.
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the imported patented product. Under the Nairobi agreements, a devel-
oping country could not only threaten an owner with forfeiture of his or
her patent, but could go a step further and grant someone else an exclu-
sive license under that owner's patent, keeping the owner out of the mar-
ket entirely. Patent owners faced with these threats will probably reduce
the price of an imported product quickly. Such provisions are counter-
productive because, faced with the potential of an adversely-held exclu-
sive license, or a premature forfeiture, industry in the United States will
not apply for a patent in any country implementing the revised treaty.
As a result there would be no possibility of working or manufacturing in
that country. Hopefully, the next session of the Diplomatic Conference,
now scheduled for late 1983 or early 1984, will result in agreements ac-
ceptable to the United States and more beneficial to developing
countries.
VII. Trademarks
Several articles of the Paris Convention concern trademarks. 26
From the beginning, in 1883, the Convention has provided that a trade-
mark duly registered in the country of origin (i.e., the country in which
the applicant is domiciled or has a commercial or industrial establish-
ment) shall be protected by any member of the Union and may be de-
nied registration only if the mark would infringe rights of third parties,
is devoid of distinctive character, or is contrary to morality or public
order.27 The original treaty also provided that each member state
should apply its own law in the determination of the registration of a
mark. As in the case of patents, a trademark registration in any country
is independent of registration of the mark in other countries. 28
Provisions of the treaty require that specific protection be accorded
by all countries to certain types of marks. For example, each member
country must refuse registration and/or prohibit use of a trademark
which is an imitation of a mark well known in that country. 29 Memorial
bearings, flags, and State emblems of member countries must be pro-
tected in every member country against registration or use.30
Although the provisions have been modified several times, the origi-
nal treaty provided for seizure on importation of any product bearing a
trademark or trade name entitled to protection in the country of impor-
tation. 3' This protection against infringement by marks on imported
goods is a potent weapon in the hands of a trademark owner, not only
26 Provision for according priority to applications for registration of trademarks has al-
ready been mentioned. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
27 Id. art. 6 quinquies.
28 Id. art. 6 (3).
29 Id. art. 6 bis.
30 Id. art. 6 ter. This article was amended in Geneva in 1982 to include the official names
of the countries of the Union. Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1982. PR/DC/INF/38.
31 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 9.
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because it eliminates the problem before any damage is done, but also
because it can usually be implemented by invoking a relatively fast-mov-
ing procedure.
VIII. Appellations of Origin - Geographic Names
Except in the case of prohibiting importation of goods bearing a
false indication of source, nothing in the Paris Convention imposes an
obligation upon any country to protect geographic names or other indi-
cations of geographic origin, sometimes referred to as appellations of ori-
gin. This is a matter of considerable importance to countries which
would like to have worldwide recognition of appellations of origin, e.g.,
Champagne wine, Swiss cheese, or Parma ham. In many countries these
appellations of origin have become generic terms or otherwise fallen into
the public domain. A relatively small group of European countries has
injected into the current efforts to satisfy demands of developing coun-
tries, proposals to compel each member of the Paris Union to protect
geographic names which have acquired recognition in the trade.32 This
issue was the subject of considerable discussion in the 1982 session of the
Diplomatic Conference, but is still far from being resolved. Substantial
agreement has been reached on provisions for protecting the public from
being misled by misuse of a geographic term, but the United States has
not agreed, and probably will not agree, to provisions designed to protect
the vested interests of private enterprise where there is no evidence that
the public is misled or deceived. 33
Developing countries are seeking protection of geographic names
from a different point of view. Having few geographic names which are
now recognized on a worldwide basis, these countries are proposing that
each developing nation designate up to two hundred geographic terms
which would be protected by every member of the Paris Union regard-
less of whether or not the terms are ever used.34 Most industrial coun-
tries are opposed to this suggestion as a matter of principle, but a
compromise involving a smaller number of terms for a specified period of
time will probably evolve in due time.
IX. Unfair Competition
General provisions of the treaty require each member state to assure
nationals of all member states effective protection against unfair compe-
tition-that is, against any act of competition contrary to honest prac-
tices in industrial or commercial matters. 35 Specifically, the Treaty
prohibits acts which create confusion with a competitor, false allegations
32 Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1982. Paris Convention,supra note 1, proposed art. 10
quater.
33 PR/DC/INF 37 Annex II.
34 PR/DC/4, proposed art. 10 quater.
35 Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10 bis.
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which discredit a competitor, and indications or allegations liable to mis-
lead the public as to the nature, characteristics, or quantity of the goods.
X. Inventors' Certificates
In Stockholm, in 1967, at the insistance of the Soviet Union and
other members of the Socialist bloc, the Paris Convention was amended
to afford priority rights to applicants for inventors' certificates - the
same priority rights as are available to applicants for patents. This right
is available only in those countries where the applicant has the un-
restricted option to apply for a patent or for an inventor's certificate. 36
Initiatives of the Soviet Union, supported by others in the socialist
bloc, have injected into the current negotiations the issue of equating
inventors' certificates with patents. 3 7 While members do not object to
this concept on principle, negotiations are stalled by the Soviet demand
that in some areas of technology only inventors' certificates would be
available. Industrial countries, led by the United States, have opposed
any exception to the rule that patents be available in Socialist bloc coun-
tries in all technologies where inventors' certificates are available. Other-
wise, socialist bloc countries would be able to curtail or even eliminate
patent protection and issue only inventors' certificates. Discussions con-
tinued in Geneva in 1982, but no agreements were reached. 38
XI. Conclusion
For a hundred years the Paris Convention has provided the frame-
work for worldwide protection of industrial property. Minimum protec-
tion for the benefit of all member countries has been strengthened by
each of the six revisions. This minimum protection has provided the basis
for a century of successful licensing and transfer of technology through-
out the world. During that time many nations which started as develop-
ing countries have become industrialized.
Developing countries continue to pursue their policy of seeking con-
cessions in all international arrangements by seeking revision of the Paris
Convention to provide benefits for themselves. Even though many in-
dustrial countries have agreed to provisions such as exclusive compulsory
licenses and automatic forfeiture, some progress has been made toward a
revision which will satisfy the position of the United States, expressed
during the 1981 session of the Conference. Probably one or two more
sessions of the Diplomatic Conference will be required before an agree-
ment will be reached concerning the content of the next revision.
36 Id. at art. 4 I.
37 Id. Stockholm Revision, 1967, revision of art. 1. See PR/DC/3.
38 Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1982. PR/DC/INF/35.
